"Prospects for the U.S. and the World -- A Crisis That Conventional Remedies Cannot Resolve" by Wynne Godley et al.
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Strategic Analysis
December 2008
PROSPECTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
AND THEWORLD:A CRISIS THAT
CONVENTIONAL REMEDIES CANNOT
RESOLVE
            ,          .              , and             
The prospects for the U.S. economy have become uniquely dreadful, if not frightening. In this
paper we argue, as starkly as we can, that the United States and the rest of the world’s economies
will not be able to achieve balanced growth and full employment unless they are able to agree
upon and implement an entirely new way of running the global economy. Yet we should admit
up front that while we feel able to outline the nature and magnitude of the emerging crisis, and
even to set down some of the things that must happen in order to counter it, we have few solid
suggestions as to how these changes can be brought about at present.
During the last 10 years, the Levy Institute has published a series of Strategic Analyses, of
which the original object was, not to make short-term forecasts, but to set forth a range of sce-
narios that displayed, over a period of five to 15 years, the likely obstacles to growth with full
employment. In the first of these papers,1 published in 1999, at a time when there was an
emphatic consensus that “the good times were here to stay,” we took the contrarian view—well
ahead of the curve—that unsustainable imbalances were building up that would eventually
require both a large fiscal stimulus and a sustained rise in net exports, preferably via a substan-
tial depreciation of the dollar.
The first part of this diagnosis was validated de facto by the huge relaxation in fiscal policy
in 2001–03, probably amounting to some $700 billion, which unintentionally (i.e., not as part of
any strategic plan) staved off the worst of the recession that took place at that time as a result of the
dot-com crash. This stimulus, in our view very properly, put the budget permanently into deficit,
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had been so proud.
The balance of payments (which had been zero in 1992)
thenmovedevenfurtherintodeficit,onascaleneverseenbefore,
reaching over 6 percent of GDP in 2006. Despite the growing
subtraction from aggregate demand resulting from this adverse
trend, the U.S. economy continued to expand at a satisfactory
rate because the balance of payments deficit was offset by a
large and growing fall in personal net saving—a decline fed by
a renewed rise in net lending to the private sector, the counter-
part to the disgraceful boom in subprime and other lending.
Once again, it should have been obvious that these trends
could not continue for long. As early as 2004, in a Strategic
Analysis subtitled Why Net Exports Must Now Be the Motor for
U.S. Growth,2 we argued that continued growth in net lending
to the private sector was an impossibility, and that at some
stage there would have to be a collapse both in lending and in
private expenditure relative to income. We also argued that it
would not be possible to save the situation by applying another
fiscal stimulus (as in 2001) because that would increase the
budget deficit to about 8 percent of GDP, implying that the
public debt would then be hurtling toward 100 percent of GDP,
with more to come. These processes were allowed to continue
nonetheless, and we perforce had to bring the short-term
prospect into sharper focus. As the turnaround in net lending
eventually became manifest, we predicted in our November
2007 analysis3—without being too precise about the timing—
that there would be a recession in 2008. At the time, we enter-
tained the possibility that, with the dollar so low, net exports
might save the day,after an uncomfortable period of recession.
The processes by which U.S.output was sustained through
thelongperiodof growingimbalancescouldnothaveoccurred
if China and other Asian countries had not run huge current
account surpluses, with an accompanying “saving glut” and a
growing accumulation of foreign exchange reserves that pre-
vented their exchange rates from falling enough, flooding U.S.
financial markets with dollars and thereby helping to finance
the lending boom.Some economists have gone so far as to sug-
gest that the growing imbalance problem was entirely the con-
sequence of the saving glut inAsian and other surplus countries.
In our view, this was an interdependent process, one in which
all parties played an active role. The United States could not
have maintained growth unless it had been happy to sponsor,
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or at least permit, private sector (particularly personal sector)
borrowing on such an unprecedented scale.
Changes in the three financial balances—government,for-
eign, and private—which illustrate the major forces driving the
U.S. economy (and the use of which has been central to all our
work), are shown in Figure 1.4 The figure also shows the level
of GDPrelativetotrend,heretakentobeactualoutputinexcess
of what it would have been with 6 percent unemployment.
Figure 1 illustrates with numbers the story just told. It
indicates how the first two output recessions (in the 1980s and
1990s) were driven by falls in private expenditure relative to
income.Then,between 1993and 2000(the“Goldilocks”period),
the appearance of moderately stable growth masked persistent
negative impulses from the government and foreign sectors,
offset by a persistent upward influence from private expendi-
ture relative to income. The brief “dot-com recession”
(2000–03) was partly offset by a fiscal stimulus, sending the
budget into deficit. Between 2004 and the first half of 2007
there was a renewed expansion in private expenditure, largely
caused by a very steep rise in the financial balance of the pri-
vate sector (i.e., a fall in private net saving).
For easy comparison, Figure 1 also illustrates the “base
run” on which our projections are founded. These are dis-
cussed in the following section.
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Sources: Federal Reserve and authors’calculationsThe Recession, 2007– ?
To get a sense of the effect of private indebtedness on private
net saving it is useful to look first at the level of private debt
expressed as a proportion of GDP since 1980 (Figure 2). The
trend was upward throughout the period,but between 2000 and
the beginning of 2007 there was a marked acceleration, the pro-
portion rising from about 130 percent to about 174 percent of
GDP. The growth suddenly ceased in the first quarter of 2008,
though it did not actually reverse course immediately.A vertical
line is drawn to indicate the third quarter of 2008,for which fig-
ures relating to the flow of funds have just become available.
The lower half of Figure 2 shows how net lending to the
private sector (logically equivalent to the change in debt illus-
trated above) fell between the third quarter of 2007 and the
third quarter of 2008, by an amount equal to about 13 percent
of GDP—by far the steepest fall over such a short time in the
history of the series.This violent change in the flow of net lend-
ing is rather surprising at first, for there is nothing in the line
just above it to prepare one for the sudden drop. It is perfectly
comprehensible(andlogicallyinevitable)nevertheless.Netlend-
ing is calculated from two components: repayments plus inter-
est, which will be a relatively stable proportion of the stock of
debt; and receipts in the form of new loans, which may be
highly volatile and which must have been falling extremely
sharply through 2008 as the credit crunch took its toll. It is
important to recognize that there is no natural floor to the flow
of net lending as it reaches zero; indeed, we are expecting gross
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lending to continue falling below repayments (causing negative
lending) for a considerable time.
As Figure 2 shows, we have assumed (heroically) that over
the next five years the level of private debt relative to GDP will
fall back to about 130 percent—roughly the level at which it
had stabilized before 2000.
Theimplicationof theseassumptionsisthatnetlendingto
the private sector falls by about 14 percent of GDP between the
first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009—a drop that
has already largely occurred—and that net lending continues
negative for a long time after that.
In our view, the unprecedented drop in interest rates
recently engineered by the Federal Reserve may not be effective
in reactivating standard lending practices, unless confidence in
future profits and income growth is restored. However, low
interest rates will keep mortgage payments low, sustaining dis-
posable income and helping the economy to recover.
Implications for Future Private Spending, GDP, and
the Other Sector Balances
Figure 1 traces our baseline projection for the government
deficit through 2012, based on neutral assumptions regarding
government expenditure and tax receipts.But it is the dramatic
fall in net lending to the private sector on which our projected
steep rise in the private sector balance and abrupt fall in GDP
over the next few years crucially depends. The balance of trade
follows by identity, though there are legitimate grounds for
supposing it to be plausible; according to our projection, it
improves quite a lot, mainly as a result of the collapse in U.S.
GDP. The projection for exports is consistent with that pub-
lished by the International Monetary Fund, and we allow the
model to generate figures for imports. The Appendix below
describes the equation in our model that relates private expen-
diture to disposable income, net lending, and capital gains.
This equation—which, with hardly any change, has served us
well since 1999—finds the“long term”marginal impact of real
expenditurewithrespectto(real)netlendingtobeabout0.48.5
As illustrated in the extreme right-hand section of Figure
1, the implication of these assumptions, taken together, is that
GDP will fall about 12 percent below trend between now and
2010, while unemployment will rise to about 10 percent. It is a
central contention of this report that the virtual collapse of pri-
vate spending will make it impossible for U.S. authorities to













































Sources: Federal Reserve and authors’calculations4 Strategic Analysis, December 2008
apply fiscal and monetary stimuli large enough to return output
and unemployment to tolerable levels within the next two years.
In support of this contention, we show in Figures 3 and 4 alter-
native projections for the main financial balances, output, and
unemployment, based on the assumption that fiscal stimuli are
immediately applied equal to an increase in government outlays
of about$380billion,or2.6percentof GDP(Shock1),andinthe
extreme case,$760 billion,or 5.3 percent of GDP (Shock 2).6
The implication of these projections is that, even with the
application of almost inconceivably large fiscal stimuli, output
will not increase enough to prevent unemployment from con-
tinuing to rise through the next two years.
U.S. Fiscal Policy Alone Will Not Eliminate the
Imbalances
It seems to us unlikely that, purely for political reasons, U.S.
budgetdeficitsontheorderof 8–10percentthroughthenexttwo
years could be tolerated, given the widespread belief that the
budget should normally be balanced. But looking at the matter
morerationally,weareboundtoacceptthatnothinglikethecon-
figuration of balances and other variables displayed in Figures 3
and 4 could possibly be sustained over any long period of time.
The budget deficits imply that the public debt relative to GDP
would rise permanently to about 80 percent, while GDP would
remain below trend,with unemployment above 6 percent.
Fiscal policy alone cannot, therefore, resolve the current
crisis. A large enough stimulus will help counter the drop in
private expenditure, reducing unemployment, but it will bring
back a large and growing external imbalance, which will keep
world growth on an unsustainable path.
Need for Concerted Action
Ourbaselinescenariomaybeconsideredasaratherextremecase,
where lending to households and firms is not restored for a con-
siderable length of time. If confidence is restored in financial
markets and lending returns to normal, prebubble levels, private
expenditure will increase,helping the economy to recover.In this
case, the private sector balance will slowly be restored to its pre-
bubblelevel,withaslowerreductioninthedebt-to-incomeratio,
and the government deficit will drop as a result of increased tax
revenues.In this case,again,the balance of payments will start to
deteriorate,unless countermeasures are taken.





































Sources: Federal Reserve and authors’calculations
Baseline Shock 1 Shock 2
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Baseline Shock 1 Shock 2ables that affect the propensity to spend out of income and
wealth for households and business taken together.More specif-
ically, our preferred equation is the following:
where HB is real household borrowing; BB, real business bor-
rowing; and PFA, the relative price of equities. The equation is
estimatedwithtwo-stageleastsquaresandisrobusttothestan-
dard battery of specification tests.
Notes
1. Godley (1999).
2. Godley, Izurieta, and Zezza (2004).
3. Godley et al. (2007).
4. In the upper part of Figure 1 we plot the balances of the pri-
vate, government, and foreign sectors, which are derived
fromthewell-knownaccountingidentityS=I+G-T+BP,
where I is private sector investment, S is private sector sav-
ing,Gisgovernmentexpenditure,Tisgovernmentreceipts,
and BP is the current account of the balance of payments.
DependentVariable: PX
Method: Two-stage least squares
Sample (adjusted): 1970:4,2008:3
Included Observations: 152 (after adjustments)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic Probability
PX(-1) 0.672896 0.041111 16.36761 0.0000
(PX(-1)) 0.187152 0.065122 2.873850 0.0047
YD 0.293243 0.037615 7.795832 0.0000
HB 0.158770 0.020951 7.578325 0.0000
BB 0.123124 0.024711 4.982601 0.0000
PFA 0.208714 0.029128 7.165473 0.0000
FA(-1) 0.013021 0.004805 2.710084 0.0075
C -45.10806 17.08443 -2.640302 0.0092
R-squared 0.999817 Mean dependent variable 5976.533
Adjusted
R-squared 0.999808 S.D. dependent variable 2204.724
S.E. of
regression 30.51185 Sum squared residual 134060.1
F-statistic 112600.5 Durbin-Watson statistic 2.003535
Probability
(F-statistic) 0.000000 Second-stage SSR 186160.9
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At the moment,the recovery plans under consideration by
the United States and many other countries seem to be con-
centrated on the possibility of using expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies.
But, however well coordinated, this approach will not be
sufficient.
What must come to pass, perhaps obviously, is a world-
wide recovery of output, combined with sustainable balances
in international trade.
Since this series of reports began in 1999, we have empha-
sized that, in the United States, sustained growth with full
employment would eventually require both fiscal expansion
and a rapid acceleration in net export demand. Part of the
needed fiscal stimulus has already occurred,and much more (it
seems) is immediately in prospect.But the U.S.balance of pay-
ments languishes, and a substantial and spontaneous recovery
is now highly unlikely in view of the developing severe down-
turn in world trade and output. Nine years ago, it seemed pos-
sible that a dollar devaluation of 25 percent would do the trick.
But a significantly larger adjustment is needed now. By our
reckoning (which is put forward with great diffidence), if the
UnitedStatesweretoattempttorestorefullemploymentbyfis-
cal and monetary means alone, the balance of payments deficit
would rise over the next,say,three to four years,to 6 percent of
GDP or more—that is,to a level that could not possibly be sus-
tained for a long period, let alone indefinitely. Yet, for trade to
begin expanding sufficiently would require exports to grow
faster than we are at present expecting, implying that in three
to four years the level of exports would be 25 percent higher
than it would have been with no adjustments.
It is inconceivable that such a large rebalancing could
occur without a drastic change in the institutions responsible
for running the world economy—a change that would involve
placing far less than total reliance on market forces.
Appendix
Private sector expenditure (PX) is assumed to adjust toward a
stable stock-flow norm, with additional impacts arising from
borrowing and capital gains. That is to say,
PXt = c0 + c1YDt + c2FAt-1 + Zt
where YD is real disposable income, FA is the real stock of
assets of the private sector, and Z represents additional vari-6 Strategic Analysis, December 2008
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Defining the government deficit as GD = G –T and the pri-
vate sector balance as IS = I – S and rearranging,we get 0 =
IS + GD + BP, which are the three lines in Figure 1, scaled
by GDP. A positive value for any of these balances implies
that the sector net contribution to aggregate demand is
positive.
The output gap measure shown in the lower part of
Figure 1 is obtained by our estimate of the difference
between real GDP and the level of real GDP that implies a
stable level of unemployment.
5. The marginal propensity to spend out of household bor-
rowing is 0.48,while the marginal propensity to spend out
of business borrowing is 0.37. See Appendix for details.
6. We assume the stimulus to be evenly split between increases
in government current and capital expenditure, and
increases in government net transfers to the private sector.
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